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This article discusses aspects of the labor theory of value in the context of the 
information industries. First, taking the Temporal Single-System Interpretation (TSSI) 
of Marx’s labor theory of value as methodology, the paper calculates economic 
demographics at the level of socially necessary labor time and prices of an example 
case.  
Second, the paper questions the assumption that the labor theory of value cannot be 
applied to the information industries. This paper tests this hypothesis with an analysis 
of the development of labor productivity in six countries.  
The paper concludes that the labor theory of value is an important tool for 
understanding the information economy and the peculiarities of the information 
commodity. 
 





<65:> The question if and how Marx’s labor theory of value applies to the information 
industries has been an important and contested issue in Marxist theory that has 
gained a new impetus with the rise of so-called “social media” platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and YouTube (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012; Beverungen, 
Böhm and Land 2015; Bolaño 2015, Carchedi 2014, Comor 2014, Foley 2013, Fuchs 
2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2015, 2016b, 2017; Huws 2014; McGuigan and 
Manzerolle 2014, Perelman 2002, 2003; Proffitt, Ekbia and McDowell 2015, Reveley 
2013, Rigi 2014, Rigi and Prey 2015, Teixeira and Rotta 2012, Zeller 2008). As part 
of neo-liberal hypes of the “new economy”, the Internet and the “creative industries”, 
the actual economic relevance of the Internet and knowledge work has often been 
overestimated (Garnham 1998, 2005). But at the same time it cannot be dismissed 
that these phenomena have some relevance and that Marxist political economy 
therefore needs to consider and analyse them (Fuchs 2013). The theoretical question 
that has been discussed within Marxist theory in recent time is what Marxian 
categories, such as value, productive labor, rent, profit, commodification, 
reproductive labor, etc can be used for understanding information and the Internet. 
This is a complex theoretical debate that is not subject of this paper.  
 
Fisher and Fuchs (2015) as well as Fuchs (2015, chapter 5) provide overview 
discussions of various aspects of this theory debate. Approaches used have for 
example included Dallas Smythe’s <66:> (1977) theory of the audience commodity 
and audience labor, rent theory, Autonomist Marxism and Marxist feminism. A basic 
question is if labor or specific labor conducted in the information economy is 
productive or unproductive. This question already goes back to Smythe’s (1977) 
works. Claims that labor in the information economy is unproductive are not new. 
They tend to reoccur within the contemporary political-economic debate about value 
in the Internet and information economy. They are often reformulations of Michael 
Lebowitz’s (1986) criticism of Dallas Smythe’s concept of audience labor. This article 
only discusses empirical aspects of the labor theory of value in the context of the 
information industries. The reader further interested in the theoretical foundations is 
therefore referred to the above-mentioned debate on this question.  
 
Information, media, communication and culture are connected terms. How do they 
relate to each other? Culture is the process and system, in which humans produce 
social meanings in society. This means that it is the system, where social information 
is produced. The term information has a broader meaning because information also 
exists in living systems, as the term genetic information indicates. For the purpose of 
this paper, information is however understood as social information. Social 
information is often also termed knowledge. Information in society exists as cognitive 
thought patters, communicated information, and information stored in objects. 
Communication is the process of symbolic interaction between humans. Mediation 
means a relation between interacting systems. A medium is therefore a system that 
enables interaction. Wherever humans communicate, there is a medium of 
communication. Culture therefore is a social information system, in which humans 
produce, communicate and use information with the help of media. It is society’s 
social information system. In this paper I will predominantly use the terms information 
economy and information industries.  
 
The information economy is in this paper defined as the realm of the production of 
information and technologies for the consumption and transmission of information1. 
This definition can be challenged on the ground of combining aspects of the 
production of physical and non-physical production, such an argument is however a 
form of cultural idealism that neglects the materiality of culture (Williams 1977). 
Raymond Williams’ argument is that separating the economy and culture is idealist: 
Culture is produced by information workers. The emergence of cultural work and the 
culture industry show the importance of the interconnection of culture and economy 
(Fuchs 2015, chapter 2). For Williams, culture is not a superstructure that sits on top 
of an economic base. Culture and ideas are just like all reality material.  
 
In discussions about the contemporary information economy, one can find 
tendencies that categories such as information, the digital, knowledge, 
cultural/information/digital/virtual labor are separated from physical labor that 
produces information technology. The most extreme example is the concept of 
immaterial labor that implies that there are parts of society that are not material, 
which contradicts a materialist worldview. Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism is 
an approach that allows us to see the dialectic of categories. So for example all work 
has mental and physical aspects (Fuchs 2015). But a specific concrete work has a 
specific degree of mental and physical aspects. Culture at the same time belongs to 
the economy and does not belong to it: Humans produce all culture and information 
is created in concrete economic production processes. The created information 
however has effects in all parts society. Information matters, makes a difference and 
has meaning not just in the economy. It has emergent effects when humans interpret 
the world based on existing information and with the help of information technology 
(Fuchs 2015).   
 
<67:> In defining the information economy, there is a difference between industry 
and occupation approaches (Machlup 1962). Occupation approaches consider the 
information economy the aggregate of the value created by all workers whose 
occupation is to produce information. Industry approaches in contrast define the 
information economy as the aggregated value produced by all companies creating 
information products. The occupation approach is methodological-individualist, 
whereas the industry approach is in line with what Marx (1867, 643) termed the 
collective worker, “a combination of workers” jointly creating a product. In the 
contemporary corporation, this includes the value created together by a variety of 
workers. In an information corporation, this includes both occupations that create 
tangible and intangible outputs that contribute together to the production of 
information technologies and information content.  
 
The OECD has in the fourth revision of the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) introduced an information sector 
(sector J) that it defines the following way: “This section includes the production and 
distribution of information and cultural products, the provision of the means to 
transmit or distribute these products, as well as data or communications, information 
technology activities and the processing of data and other information service 
activities”2. It, however, also defines a separate arts, entertainment and recreation 																																																								
1 In the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev.4) these are the 
following categories: D18 printing and reproduction of recorded media, D26 computer, electronic and optical 
products, D58T63 publishing, audiovisuals, broadcasting, telecommunications, IT; D72 research, D73 
advertising and marketing research, D85 education, D90T93 arts, entertainment, recreation. 
2 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcs.asp?Cl=27&Lg=1&Co=J  
sector (sector R) and defines scientific research, advertising, market research, 
consulting, accounting as part of sector M: professional, scientific and technical 
activities. Given that science, art, entertainment, research, advertising, consulting 
and accounting all produce some form of information, such a definition is confusing 
and results in a narrow understanding of the information sector. 
 
Goodridge, Hasek and Wallis (2014) have measured the investment in intangible 
assets ordered by year, industries and intangible asset types. In their conceptual 
framework, intangible assets are comprising R&D, mineral exploration, financial 
product innovation, design, training, artistic originals, organisational structure, 
software, branding. They calculated that in 2011, intangible asset investment was 
significantly larger in the UK economy than tangible asset investment. The core 
distinction in this approach is the one between tangibles and intangibles. The basic 
question is however if this strict separation can be upheld in the contemporary 
economy. A computer clearly is a tangible machine. It however is an information 
technology, i.e. a data processing machine. So it has to do with a tangible form that 
processes an intangible asset. It is therefore unclear how the computer as asset 
should exactly be classified in this approach. 
 
Higgs, Cunningham and Pagan (2007, 20) define the creative economy as “human 
activities related with the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of 
creative goods and services”. They say it is broader than the term cultural industries 
that focuses on artistic production and stresses the commercial use of “symbolic 
knowledge and skills” (4). The authors understand the Creative Trident as the total of 
the creative occupations in the core creative industries as well as in other industries. 
The definition includes in contrast to the ISIC’s understanding of the information 
sector a broad range of information industries (music, performing arts, film, TV, radio, 
advertising, marketing, software, online, publishing, architecture, design, visual arts) 
in the core creative industries. It furthermore combines the industry and occupation 
approach.  
 
Baskhshi, Freeman and Higgs (2013) take a comparable approach that suggests 
measurements of the creative intensity of creative occupations in any industry. They 
make creative talent the defining feature of a creative occupation. The defining 
qualities of creative activity are <68:> that it is a novel process, mechanisation 
resistant, non-repetitive, non-uniform, independent of context, and that it involves 
interpretation not mere transformation (24). “This confers a unique and important 
quality on the creative worker within the creative process, namely that it is difficult to 
mechanise the creative process and hence to substitute machines or devices for the 
humans, reversing a trend that has dominated much of history. Implementing a 
creative decision is not really a creative role, we would argue, but making one is” 
(Baskhshi, Freeman and Higgs 2013, 22). Based on this approach the authors 
calculated that in 2010, 8.7% of the UK workforce was part of the creative economy 
and that the majority of these workers were employed outside the core creative 
industries.  
 
The two latter approaches have a strong focus on measuring occupations. However, 
in capitalism, “the commodity-form of the product of labour […] is the economic cell-
form” (Marx 1867, 90). The commodity is the economic form that objectifies value 
generated by humans and whose sale results in the realisation of monetary profit. 
Like Marx, it therefore makes sense to start economic analysis with the commodity 
form. Speaking about the information sector, this means that one must have a look at 
the commodity form of information as the economic cell-form of the information 
sector. The focus on creative occupations makes individual activities throughout the 
entire economy that generate novel information based in highly skilful and qualified 
manner the cell-form of this sector. The notions of creative labor, creative industries 
and the creative economy overestimate the role of highly educated and qualified non-
replaceable labor. Many information commodities are generated in a division of labor 
that involves occupations that produce information, services and physical products, 
that have varying forms of qualification (low, medium, high skill), etc. The point is that 
for the production of certain information commodities, the labor time of a diverse set 
of workers is needed. All of their labor-time is reflected in the commodity. A labor 
theory of value applied to information sector must therefore start with the information 
commodity produced by a collective (but diverse) information worker as the basic 
focus.  
 
“Editing a film is a creative task – but operating a 6 plate 35mm Steenbeck editing 
table under the direction of the editor is not” (Baskhshi, Freeman and Higgs 2013, 
22). The point here is that both the editor and the operator’s labor-time is objectified 
in the film as commodity and that they work in the same division of labor of the movie 
industry. To argue that the first’s labor is creative and the second is not can easily 
create the impression that only skilled workers are creating surplus-value and 
unskilled ones do not. In the production of an information commodity such as a film 
both of them are however productive workers, i.e. the exploitation of their labor that is 
expended in time results in commodities that are sold in order to accumulate capital.  
 
There are certainly informational occupations that do not result in the production of 
an information commodity, but rather in different commodity types. They are part of a 
collective workforce outside the information sector. The distinction between the 
occupational and the industry definition of industries certainly is feasible and can be 
combined. The question however is which one fits best for a Marxist understanding of 
the economy.  
 
To avoid an elitist definition of creativity, one can also resort to Marx (1867, 284), 
who argued that at the “end of every labour process, a result emerges which had 
already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed 
ideally”. All human labor requires mental planning and anticipation of the result, albeit 
with different qualities. All occupations <69:> have information dimensions and are 
creative in the general understanding of the word that Marx hints at, namely that they 
create use-values that satisfy needs.  
 
This brief non-exhaustive discussion shows why this paper uses a framework, in 
which the information industry is defined as the realm of the production, circulation 
and consumption of information products, both information goods and services. Many 
information products take on the form of commodities. There is however a growing 
sector of the information economy that transcends the commodity form and in which 
peer produced information takes on the form of an informational commons. Given 
this definition of the information economy, the share of the information industry in 
total national value added was in 2010 15.6% in Finland, 14.1% in France, 12.4% in 
Germany, 12.0% in Italy, and 10.6% in Norway (data source: OECD STAN)3. The 																																																								
3 Comparable results can be obtained for other countries. OECD STAN at the moment of writing (January 2014) 
only provides data for 15 countries because ISIC Rev. 5 is still a relatively new metric introduced in 2008 that 
total employment share of this sector was in the same year 16.3% in Finland, 13.8% 
in France, 13.2% in Germany, 11.7% in Italy, and 14.2% in Norway (ibid.). One may 
now say these are significant, but not overwhelming shares. Let’s, however, compare 
these data to the manufacturing sector4: It accounted in 2010 for 14.8% of value 
added in Finland, 9.7% in France, 14.8% in Finland, 20.0% in Germany, 17.1% in 
Italy, and 7.3% in Norway. Manufacturing comprised in the same year 13.4% of total 
employment in Finland, 10.2% in France, 15.9% in Germany, 15.1% in Italy, 8.8% in 
Norway. 6 out of 10 country-specific variables in these example calculations have 
higher values in the information than in the manufacturing sector.  
 
In this paper, section 2 studies an example case – the German information economy 
– with the help of the labor theory of value in order to formulate some assumptions. 
Section 3 tests based on the same case the assumption that the labor theory of value 
cannot be applied to the information sector.  
 
2. The Information Industry and Marx’s Labor Theory of Value 
 
Some representatives of Autonomist Marxist theory argue for example that the law of 
value does not apply to the information economy because it is networked and based 
on co-operation. Antonio Negri (1991, 172) writes for example that Marx in the 
Grundrisse argues for the death of the law of value. Paolo Virno (2004, 100) says 
that the development of capitalism refutes the law of value. Hardt and Negri (2004, 
145) claim that the law of value in contemporary capitalism “makes no sense”. 
Vercellone (2010, 90) speaks of capitalism’s “crisis of measurement”. But Marx 
(1857/1858, 705) in the specific passage that these authors refer to does not talk 
about the law of value in capitalism, but rather about the death of the law of value in 
a communist society (Rosdolsky 1977, 428). The law of value is a foundation of all 
forms of capitalism (Postone 2008, 126). 
 
A comparable argument has been made by Nicholas Garnahm, who assumes that 
the labor theory of value is invalid in the information industries. Nicholas Garnham is 
one of these scholars. Garnham (1998, 103) says that the labor theory of value 
works if “labour time is largely a matter of energy and expended” and productivity 
rises due to saving of human energy expenditure based on technology. He questions 
whether this works in a “non-entropic economy of bits”. The labor theory of value for 
Garnham works well “in an economy based […] on the measurable increase in the 
productivity of human work-time and especially on the saving of human energy inputs 
through the substitution of natural energy sources” (Garnham 2000, 146). “In an 
economy dominated by <70:> information production any stable relation between 
labour and value breaks down” (Garnham 2000, 146). Garnham (2011, 47-48) writes 
that the economic concepts of productivity and efficiency cannot be applied to culture 
because of an “uncertain relationship between labor inputs and outputs” (Garnham 
2011, 47). Information labor could not easily be automated and mechanised.  
 
In a newer version of his argument, Garnham argues that the labor theory of value 
“served a useful analytical function and within the relatively simple material 																																																																																																																																																																													
has not been applied to older data and is not used for statistical purposes in all countries. No data is available for 
the UK. The data for the USA is not sufficiently disaggregated for use. See the appendix to this paper for a 
methodological discussion (http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/IJPE_Appendix.pdf). 
4 I calculated value added of manufacturing based on ISCI Rev. 5 aggregated category D10T33 minus D18 and 
D26 that according I consider to be part of the information economy. 
economies of the day bore some relevant relationship to relative prices and the 
division of the surplus and thus to class relations. […] In an economy based upon a 
complex division of labour, on a growing ratio of dead labour to living labour and on 
the application of knowledge, it made, and makes, less and less sense” (Garnham 
2016, 295-296; for a response see Fuchs 2016a). Garnham argues that Piero Sraffa 
(1960) in his book Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities has shown 
that “the inequalities of capitalism can be generated within the process of commodity 
production and exchange without recourse to an exploitation theory of labour” 
(Garnham 2016, 297; for a critique see Fuchs 2016a).  
 
One should bear in mind that Cantabrigian economics (Pierro Sraffa, Joan Robins, 
John Eatwell, and others) has resulted in Marxist critique. In this approach, “people 
as human beings – and, more importantly, as historical social classes – are given no 
role in the process of production” (Roosevelt 1975, 7). The Cantabrigians separate 
“relations between things from relations between people” (Roosevelt 1975, 19), 
which results in a commodity-fetishistic model of capitalism, in which “things produce 
things” (19). “However ingenious the Cantabrigians are in analyzing price 
phenomena, they never connect such phenomena with social relations in the way 
that Marx did in Capital” (20). Sraffa and Robinson’s approaches constitute a “[p]rice 
theory without value theory” (19). Robinson (1966, 22) revises Marx theory and 
argues that “no point of substance in Marx’s argument depends upon the labour 
theory of value”. For Marx, distribution and production are intertwined social 
processes, for the Cantabrigians they are separate, production being technical in 
nature and distribution social. For Sraffa (1960, 9), surplus is not surplus-value, but a 
physical “surplus production” of commodities, “a surplus of some commodities” (26). 
In contrast, for Marx surplus is surplus-value that stems from capital’s exploitation of 
labor in class relations.  
 
For Marx, there is a social production process, in which humans enter social relations 
of production and in these social relations use means of production for creating new 
goods that are distributed in relations of distribution (Fuchs 2016b). Production and 
distribution are interrelated social processes grounded in human activity. For Marx, 
human creativity and activity sustains any economy. Capitalism is a mode of 
production that is based on the general production of commodities that reflects 
socially necessary labor time, i.e. an average quanta of human labor that is exploited 
by capital. Production is a social process, in which humans work together in order to 
produce a good or service. In capitalism, this involves a division of labor. In addition, 
in complex economies there are multiple organisational units of production creating 
similar types of goods and services. In capitalism, this involves a social process of 
competition for productivity levels, price advantages, markets, customers and profits. 
Marx’s labor theory of value is a theory of time in capitalism (Fuchs 2016b; Fuchs 
2015, chapter 4). It distinguishes between necessary labor-time and surplus labor-
time. The first constitutes the value of labor-power and the value of the necessary 
means of production. The second is surplus-value that is unremunerated labor time. 
Parts of the working day are not paid, which results in monetary profit and a surplus 
product owned by the capitalist class. Capitalism means a struggle focused <71:> on 
paid and unpaid labor-time. The working class has the interest that all of its time is 
remunerated, whereas the capitalist class has the interest that no labor time is paid 
at all. The class struggles oscillates depending on the power of the involves forces 
somewhere between the poles of maximum wage and maximum profit that 
corresponds to the two extremes of the payment of all labor-time on the one end and 
the payment of no labor-time at all on the other end.  
 
To argue that increasing importance of the information economy invalidates Marx’s 
labor theory of value means that time and labor-time do no longer play any role in the 
economy. Consequently, the class conflict must have come to an end and the 
production of information must have become autonomous from humans. But none of 
the two can be observed today. There are several reasons why the labor theory of 
values continues to apply in information capitalism and digital capitalism (see Fuchs 
2014a, 2015, 2016b, 2017 for details of these arguments): 
• First, commercial software and other information goods are not just produced once 
and then copied, but there are often new versions, constant updates, and forms of 
support labor.  
• Second, one has to see that large parts of the Internet’s political economy are 
based on targeted advertising. Google and Facebook are not communications 
corporations. They are the world’s largest advertising companies. Advertising is 
not just based on the labor-time of marketing professionals, but also on the 
attention time of audiences and on commercial Internet usage time that is (unpaid) 
labor time. 
• Third, there is an international division of digital labor, in which various forms of 
labor are organised. It ranges from the exploitation of enslaved miners in the 
Congo, Tayloristic ICT assemblers at Foxconn in China, or software engineers in 
India or the Silicon Valley to various forms of unpaid online labor (Fuchs 2014a, 
2014b, 2015). The production of information technology is highly exploitative and 
time-consuming.   
• Fourth, there are various forms of irregular, unpaid, precarious, outsourced, 
crowdsourced, and click-worked digital labor. Examples include the usage of 
Facebook, Google, YouTube, Weibo, LinkedIn, Pinterest and Instagram; online 
customer reviews on Amazon or Yelp; work via freelancer platforms such as 
Upwork, PeoplePerHour, Amazon Mechanical Turk and ClickWorker; the 
participation in customer surveys, installing software updates, deleting spam, 
unsubscribing from spam lists, the time spent on online daring platforms such as 
match.com or Tinder, answering professional e-mails via the mobile or tablet out of 
regular working hours, working on the train, tube or in cafés; online travel booking, 
etc.  
Consumer and prosumer labor is shadow work because it does not in an obvious 
way feel like work, but creates value for corporations. It takes time. And it takes 
time away that could be used outside the commodity culture. It substitutes paid 
labor by precarious and unpaid labor and by reducing corporations’ wage-sum 
helps increasing their profits. Consumers and users have become part of the 
working class. 
 
The digital law of value has created new forms of exploitation as well as 
contradictions that allow the creation of new spheres of non-commercial, alternative, 
co-operative production and a solidarity, commons-based, and peer production 
economy outside the realm of capitalism that undermine the law of value. The 
political aim of destroying the law of value is not an automatism that flows from 
information and information technology. It can rather only be achieved in conscious 
political struggles for the decommodification of information, the economy and the 
world. It requires the dialectical political unity of the social movement “crowd” and the 
party (Dean 2016).   
 
<72:> To show that the labor theory of value applies to the information economy, I 
employ in this paper the Temporal Single-System Interpretation (TSSI) of Marxian 
value theory for the analysis of the German information economy. One could 
certainly discuss if the TSSI is the right methodology or if another one should be 
used, which is a more scholastic discussion that I leave to others. One could simply 
in an equal manner apply other interpretations and check the feasibility of the results. 
The space of this paper allows however to just apply one method of analysis and the 
TSSI seems to be an interesting approach.  
 
The TSSI is a version of Marxian value theory. It assumes a dynamic character of 
accumulation. It has been created by a group of economists around Andrew Kliman 
and Alan Freeman. Some of the basic insights of this interpretation are: 
• Marx’s theory is not erroneous or inconsistent. It does not require a correction or 
revision with external assumptions, but is in itself consistent. 
• Claims that Marx’s theory is inconsistent or erroneous often serve the purpose to 
suggested that it should not be used today and that its political implications are 
wrong. The consequential assumption of such approaches is that capitalism and 
class should not be abolished.  
• Critics of Marx’s theory often either argue that his theory of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall, the labor theory of value, or his solution to the transformation 
problem (the transformation of labor values into prices) are false and therefore 
invalidate his theory. 
• The TSSI shows that all three aspects are internally consistent on the grounds of 
Marx’s theory. 
• The TSSI assumes the existence of a single-system of labor values and prices. 
Values and prices are not seen as being independent, but standing in a 
relationship to each other. The Monetary Expression of Labor Time (MELT) is a 
variable that can be calculated for an economic system and that allows the 
transformation of labor values (calculated in hours) into prices (calculated in 
monetary units) and vice-versa.  
• The TSSI is temporal because it assumes a dynamic character of the capitalist 
economy. This means that the outputs of one time period (typically one full year) 
act as inputs into and influence the outputs of the next time period. This means 
that the total hours worked during one period of time create means of production 
that are typically used during the next period of time. One therefore does not have 
to assume that the values and prices of the economic inputs have to equal those 
of the outputs during a certain period of time.  
 
Alan Freeman (2010, 592) argues that the price of a commodity “at time t1 must be 
equal to the sale price at time t0” (Freeman 2010, 592), i.e. there is a connection 
between output and input prices of one production period and the next. “In each 
period, new prices are established in circulation on the basis of the values arising 
thus from the immediately preceding phase of production” (Freeman 1998, 11). The 
TSSI also assumes, as Marx did, that commodities do not necessarily sell at their 
value, but can be sold above or below their value: “the production price of a 
commodity is not at all identical with its value. [...] It has been shown that the 
production price of a commodity may stand above or below its value and coincides 
with it only in exceptional cases” (Marx 1894, 892).  
 
<73:> In the TSSI, the “value is quite distinct from the price, and the difference is a 
quantitative one. In exchange the values that have arisen in the manner we have just 
described will be exchanged against money and this money, in exactly the same way 
but with new proportions, will represent value, measurable in hours. Some will realize 
more hours than their value, and some will realise less. Conversely, since every 
amount of value may equally well be represented in money, we may assign a money 
magnitude to their value and we will find that their value, measured in money, is in 
general systematically different from their price” (Freeman 1998, 11). 
 
Two main assumptions of the TSSI are that: 
1) “valuation is temporal, so input and output process can differ”, 
2) “values and prices, though quite distinct, are determined interdependently” (Kliman 
2007, 2). 
 
As indicated in the introduction, there is an ongoing theory debate in Marxist political 
economy about value-creation in the information economy. This discourse has 
theoretical importance, but has remained on a purely philosophical and theory level 
devoid of applications to empirical economic analysis, especially mathematical and 
statistical political economy. This paper takes a different approach and is especially 
interested in empirical analysis of available statistical data. The TSSI is an approach 
that is grounded in the labor theory of value and mathematical and statistical 
analysis. The TSSI is the most thorough and rigorous mathematical formulation of 
the relationship between labor and time, for which it uses the category of the 
Monetary Expression of Labor Time (MELT), a category introduced first by Ramos 
(1998/99). Furthermore the TSSI allows conceiving the information economy as 
value-creating, which stands in contrast to some other contemporary approaches 
such as certain versions of Autonomist Marxism. 
 
The TSSI implies that for calculating the value of a commodity (measured in hours or 
units of money) and how it differs from the commodity price (also measured in hours 
or units of money), the wage (variable capital) needs to be transformed into “the 
value of the money used to purchase that worker’s labour power” (Freeman 2010, 
595), which is done based on a ratio called the Monetary Expression of Labor Time 
(MELT): The MELT is obtained by calculation ratio of the whole economy’s total 
money to total labor-time (measured in hours) during a specific period of time, such 
as one year (Freeman 1998, 13). It indicates the degree of value measured in money 
that workers create on average in one hour of labor. The MELT’s unit of 
measurement is £/hour (or another currency). When Marx speaks about value, he 
mostly means units of labor time, but sometimes also monetary values. The MELT is 
a way of connecting these two measures of economic value. 
 
The TSSI implies that value is produced in the production process and not when the 
commodity is sold (Kliman 2007, 37). The latter interpretation has been given 
recently by Michael Heinrich (1999, 2012) in what can be characterized not as a 
labor theory of value, but a money theory of value that implies that the worker is not 
exploited if the commodity s/he produces cannot be sold on the market (for a critique, 
see Kliman et al. 2013).  
 
I will outline how the labor theory of value can be mathematically applied to 
information industries with the help of an example. I have chosen data for specific 
industries in Germany for the years 2001-2011 that were obtained from the OECD’s 
Database for Structural Analysis (STAN). I have chosen Germany because the 
required data is relatively complete for this <74:> country and the time period 2001-
2011 because data is available for it based on the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 4, that in contrast to ISIC 
Revision 3 provides more detailed data for the information industries. The appendix 
of this paper discusses differences between the ISIC Revisions 3 and 4 in relation to 
the information economy and the classification codes used for defining the 
information sector in this paper. It also discusses the role of the 
finance/insurance/real estate industry in the model underlying the article. The 
appendix is available at http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/IJPE_Appendix.pdf  
 
The method applied to this data was inspired by Freeman (1998) and Kliman (2007, 
25-26) and included the following steps: 
 
• The following data was obtained from OECD STAN and taken to represent as 
suggested by Shaikh and Tonak (1994) the following Marxian variables: 
INTI=intermediate inputs: corresponds to constant capital c, 
LABR=compensation of employees: corresponds to variable capital v, 
NOS=net operating surplus: corresponds to profit p,  
HRSE=hours worked by employees h. 
• All data was available in aggregated form at the level of industries as defined by 
ISIC Rev. 4. 
• Not all labor is productive and therefore there are industries that add no value to 
the economy in a Marxian framework, but either produce no value or consume it. 
This question is contested in Marxist value theory and the empirical results one 
obtains depend on the theoretical choices one makes. I am in favour of a relatively 
broad concept of productive labor (Fuchs 2014a, 2014b, 2015), but assume that 
the financial and insurance industry as well as real estate do not create value. 
Data for these industries is however included in STAN (categories D64-D66 
Financial and insurance activities, D68 Real estate activities). I therefore 
transformed the obtained data in such a way that I excluded data for these 
categories and recalculated the totals for all variables. Finance produces interest 
and real estate creates rent. Interest and rent are paid for by wages and profits, 
they consume and do not create surplus and value. 
• At a specific time t, the MELT can be calculated as (Freeman 1998): 
MELT (t) = (cp(t) + vp(t) + pp(t) [in prices]) / (ch(t-1) + vh(t-1) + ph(t-1) [in years or 
hours] 
cp(t)… total constant capital at the price level at point of time t (measured in 
monetary units) 
vp(t)… total variable capital at the price level at point of time t (measured in 
monetary units) 
pp(t)… total profit at the price level at point of time t (measured in monetary units) 
ch(t-1)…total constant capital at the level of labor-time at the point of time t-1 
(measured in hours or years)  
vh(t-1)…total variable capital at the level of labor-time at the point of time t-1 
(measured in hours or years) (=necessary labor-time at the level of wages) 
ph(t-1)…total profit at the level of labor-time at the point of time t-1 (measured in 
hours or years) (=surplus labor-time)  
• I calculated the economy-wide MELT for the German economy for the years 2000-
2011 (t=0, 1, 2….10). Table 1 gives an overview. The initial MELT (0) in the years 
2000 was calculated as:  
MELT (0) = (cp(0) + vp(0) + pp(0) [in prices]) / (ch(0) + vh(0) + ph(0)) [in hours] 
<75:> The total hours worked during a year (=h) in the economy represent the 
hours during which living labor creates the value of its labor power (wages, 
necessary labor time) and new value (surplus-value, surplus labor time): 
h(t)= vh(t) + ph(t) 
h(t)…total hours worked in year t 
vh(t)…necessary labor time in year t  
ph(t)… surplus labor time in year t 
Living value per hour: lvph(t) = (vp(t) + pp(t))/h(t) [€/hour] 
vp(t)…total wages in year t 
pp(t)…total profits in year t 
h(t)…total hours worked in year t 
The value of constant capital has already been created at this point of time. It is 
transferred to commodities and represents specific amounts of value: 
ch(t)=cp(t)/lvph(t)  
ch(t)…constant capital in year t, measured in hours  
cp(t)…constant capital in year t, measured in monetary units (€) 
lvph(t)…living value per hour in year t, measured in €/hour 
Given all these assumptions, MELT(t) can be calculated for t=0 and then iteratively 
for all other points of time t=1…n. 
• I selected the following information industries and industry aggregates for analysis: 
D58T63 Information and communication 
D58T60 Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
D58 Publishing 
D59T60 Audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
D61 Telecommunications 
D62T63 IT and other information services 
D73 Advertising and marketing research 
D90T93 Arts, entertainment and recreation  
• In the next step of analysis, I calculated several measures for all time periods and 
for all of these industries: 
Sum of commodity prices prp(t) = cp(t) + vp(t) + pp(t) [€] 
ch(t)=cp(t)/MELT(t) [h] 
vh(t)=vp(t)/MELT(t) [h] 
Surplus-value: sh(t)=h(t) – vh(t) [h] 
Surplus-labor: sp(t)=sh(t) * MELT(t) [€] 
prh(t) = prp(t) / MELT(t) [h] 
ph(t) = p(t) / MELT(t) [h] 
Value of output: wp(t)=cp(t) + vp(t) + sp(t) [€] 
<76:> Value of output: wh(t)=ch(t) + vh(t) + sh(t) [h] 
Difference between value and price: Δp = prp(t) – wp(t)  
Difference between value and price: Δh = ph(t) – wh(t) 
Value rate of exploitation: ev = sh(t) / vh(t) = sp(t) / vp(t) (surplus labor / necessary 
labor)  
Price rate of exploitation: ep = ph(t) / vh(t) = pp(t) / vp(t) 
Organic composition of capital: ocv = ch(t) / vh(t) = cp(t) / vp(t) (constant capital / 
variable capital) 
Value rate of profit: rpv = sh(t) / (ch(t) + vh(t)) = sp(t) / (cp(t) + vp(t)) (surplus / 
(constant capital + variable capital)) 
Price rate of profit: rpp =  ph(t) / (ch(t) + vh(t)) = pp(t) / (cp(t) + vp(t)) (profit / (constant 

























29.1 29.9 29.5 30.4 31.8 33.0 35.0 36.8 37.2 33.0 36.1 34.6 
Table 1: The German economy’s MELT, 2000-2011 (in € per hour) 
 
In the presentation of the results that follows, I will use the following conventions for 
industries:  
1 D58T63 Information and communication 
2 D58T60 Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
3 D58 Publishing activities 
4 D59T60 Audiovisual and broadcasting activities 
5 D61 Telecommunications 
6 D62T63 IT and other information services 
7 D73 Advertising and market research 
8 D90T93 Arts, entertainment and recreation 
 
In order to make the results easier to understand, I converted labor hours into full 
time-equivalent labor years, assuming a full-time working week of 35 hours and 48 
working weeks per year. In Germany, the minimum statutory leave is 4 weeks, so 1 
working year = 35 * 48 hours = 1680 hours 
 
Table 2 presents a comparison of the German information industries’ output value in 
the years 2001-2011. Table 3 gives the same data, but not calculated in years, but in 
monetary units (€). The data show that in all analysed information industries, 
information tends to be sold at prices higher than values. Table 4 shows how much 
larger prices are than values. Prices tend to be between 1.3% and 47.0% higher than 
values. There is only one case, where the total value is higher than the total price 
(industry #6, 2008). The annual average differences vary between a minimum of 
8.2% in 2008 and a maximum of 20.6% in 2002. The annual average price-value-
difference for all information industries cumulated over the years 2001-2011 is 
around 13%. The price-value-difference is on average largest in the IT industry 
(26.3%) and lowest in the telecommunications industry (5.1%). 
 

































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Comparison of the value of output wh(t) and prices ph(t) in the German 
information industries, in thousand years  
 

































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Comparison of the value of output wp(t) and prices pp(t) in the German 
information industries, in billion € 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ø 
1 
 
17.8% 20.6% 13.0% 15.2% 11.6% 12.0% 9.8% 8.9% 17.9% 17.8% 12.0% 13.7% 
2 10.4% 7.8% 7.0% 6.8% 8.2% 7.0% 8.9% 13.1% 23.1% 18.5% N/A 11.1% 
5 35.8% 47.0% 25.3% 35.4% 22.4% 28.2% 19.4% 15.9% 18.5% 15.3% N/A 26.3% 
6 11.0% 11.5% 5.8% 3.5% 3.6% 1.5% 1.3% -1.8% 11.8% 2.9% N/A 5.1% 
8 14.4% 16.1% 15.1% 13.9% 11.0% 8.3% 4.9% 4.9% 11.4% 6.5% 10.6% 10.7% 
ø 17.9% 20.6% 13.2% 14.9% 11.4% 11.4% 8.9% 8.2% 16.5% 11.0% 11.3% ≈ 13% 
Table 4: Differences between prices pp,h(t) and values of output wp,h(t) in the 
German information industries, in % 
 
Table 5 shows the organic composition of capital – the relationship of constant to 
variable capital – in the German information industries in the years from 2001 until 
2011. It ranges between 0.2 and 4.9. The annual average for all industries is 1.9, 
which means that on average constant capital tends to be almost twice as large as 
variable capital. The organic composition tends to be especially high in broadcasting 
and telecommunications and rather low in IT and information services as well as 
advertising and market research. This is an indication that broadcasting and 
telecommunications are particularly technology-intensive, whereas IT, advertising 




 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ø 
1 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.8 
2 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.8  2.6 
3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.7  2.2 
4 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1  3.2 
5 2.4 2.5 3.5 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.8 4.9  3.6 
6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8  0.7 
7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.2 
8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 
ø 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 ≈ 1.9 
Table 5: Organic composition of capital c/v in the German information 
industries, 2001-2011, in % 
 
The rate of profit is the relationship of output-surplus to input, the ratio of profit to 
investments. There is a difference between the price rate of profit and the value rate 
of profit (Kliman 2007, 26). The value rate of profit calculates the output-surplus 
based on total surplus-value, whereas the profit rate of profit uses total monetary 
profits: 
value rate of profit rpv = sh(t) / (ch(t) + vh(t)) = sp(t) / (cp(t) + vp(t)) 
price rate of profit rpp =  ph(t) / (ch(t) + vh(t)) = pp(t) / (cp(t) + vp(t))  
Tables 6 and 7 show the value and price rates of profit for the German information 
industries in the years 2001-2011. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ø 
1 -2.1% -3.8% -3.4% -2.2% -1.0% 0.5% 2.2% 1.8% -3.0% -0.6% -3.0% -1.3% 
2 0.0% -1.0% -0.6% 0.5% 1.6% 2.6% 3.5% 3.4% -0.6% 1.5% N/A 1.1% 
3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
5 -0.4% -1.6% -1.1% -0.1% 0.5% 1.1% 2.1% 1.8% -1.1% 0.1% N/A 0.1% 
6 -6.4% -9.3% -9.0% -7.5% -5.5% -2.5% 1.0% 0.2% -7.3% -3.2% N/A -4.9% 
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8 12.3% 11.4% 12.8% 16.6% 22.1% 26.7% 31.9% 31.4% 20.0% 24.2% 17.5% 20.6% 
ø 0.7% -0.8% -0.3% 1.5% 3.5% 5.7% 8.2% 7.7% 1.6% 4.4% 7.2% ≈3% 
Table 6: The value rate of profit rpv in the German information industries, 2001-
2011, in%  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ø 
1 
24.4% 26.4% 14.5% 20.3% 
16.5
% 20.0% 19.4% 16.8% 21.4% 17.0% 12.9% 19.1% 
2 
14.4% 9.6% 9.1% 10.3% 
14.2
% 13.7% 17.9% 22.8% 29.9% 27.4% N/A 16.9% 
3 
14.5% 12.3% 12.8% 15.1% 
16.0
% 17.2% 22.8% 33.6% 41.7% 40.1% N/A 22.6% 
4 
14.4% 6.5% 5.0% 5.1% 
12.3
% 9.9% 11.6% 8.1% 13.6% 11.3% N/A 9.8% 
5 
49.7% 62.4% 30.7% 46.0% 
29.1
% 38.5% 28.1% 22.6% 20.8% 18.5% N/A 34.6% 
6 9.0% 3.1% -9.5% -11.1% -5.2% -2.6% 5.9% -3.8% 8.3% -0.7% N/A -0.7% 
7 
83.7% 71.7% 83.0% 75.4% 
65.4
% 79.8% 86.1% 87.1% 64.1% 63.8% N/A 76.0% 
8 
54.3% 57.0% 57.6% 62.4% 
66.1
% 67.8% 68.4% 68.1% 59.9% 57.0% 52.2% 61.0% 
ø 
33.0% 31.1% 25.4% 27.9% 
26.8
% 30.6% 32.5% 31.9% 32.5% 29.3% 32.6% ≈30% 
Table 7: The price rate of profit rpp in the German information industries, 2001-
2011, in% 
 
The average value rate of profit in the German information industries for the years 
2001-2011 is 3%, the average price profit rate 30%. This means that in terms of 
value calculated as average socially necessary labor time, the surplus tends to be 
around 3% of investments, whereas in terms of monetary prices it is around 30%. 
This difference derives from the previously presented result that there is a tendency 
that information commodities are sold above their values. In the German information 
industry, particularly high profit rates have continuously been achieved in the first 
decade of the 21st century in advertising and market research as well as arts, 
entertainment and recreation. 
 
In the case of information, because of a sunk-cost rule the initial copy or prototype 
tends to be cost-intensive. This means that the value measured as labor-time that is 
required for <78:> information production is high. But once information is created, the 
value for reproducing it is extremely small or almost zero. There are only costs and 
labor-time for reproducing and circulating information or for updating it, but not for 
originally creating it because it is not used up during consumption. A mechanism that 
is therefore of particular importance for achieving profit by selling information is to 
secure copyrights and to sell copies and licenced usage of information at prices that 
stand above labor-values. The difference between the low production-price of a copy 
guaranteed by low labor inputs and in comparison a relatively high sales-price is an 
important principle of capital accumulation in the information industries.  
 
This mechanism can be observed in the data presented in this section: I showed for 
the German information industries that on average during a period of ten years, the 
difference between <79:> commodity values and commodity prices was about 13%. 
The price/value difference reached an average maximum of 26.3% in 
telecommunications, where the peak difference was 47.0% in 2002. In publishing, 
audiovisuals and broadcasting the average price/value difference was 11.1%, in 
IT/information services 5.1%, and in arts, entertainment and recreation 10.7%. We 
can in comparison calculate the price/value difference for the entire German 
economy (excluding finance and renting that we consider as unproductive sectors) 
and the manufacturing <80:> sector (table 8). We can see that on average 
manufacturing goods tended to be sold 4.8% above their values. In the total 
economy, values on average roughly equalled prices. This is not a proof, but a 
potential indication that the information industries tend to be especially characterised 
by selling commodities above their average values and to accumulate surplus-profits. 
To substantiate this assumption, further research will be needed in the future with 
data from different countries. The assumption that the information industries use a 
special form of capital accumulation is further substantiated by the fact that the price 
profit rate in manufacturing was on average around 7% and in the total German 
economy (excluding finance and real estate) around 13% (table 9), whereas the 
average in the information industries was around 30% (table 7). In these data, profits 
tend to be quite higher in relation to investment costs in the information industries 
than both in the total German economy and the manufacturing industry.  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ø 
M 3.3% 4.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.4% 5.3% 5.1% 3.6% 4.1% 5.6% 8.0% 4.8% 
E -0.3% -1.8% -1.1% -0.3% 0.3% 1.0% 2.1% 2.5% -1.1% 1.0% -1.9% 0.1% 
Table 8: Differences between prices pp,h(t) and values of output wp,h(t) in the 
German manufacturing industry (=M) and the entire economy (=E; excluding 
finance and real estate), in % 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ø 
M 5.0% 4.9% 5.5% 6.5% 7.1% 8.4% 9.1% 7.2% 3.8% 7.8% 8.5% 6.7% 
E 11.5% 11.8% 11.6% 12.4% 13.0% 14.0% 14.5% 13.4% 11.0% 12.4% 11.8% 12.5% 
Table 9: The price rate of profit rpp in the German manufacturing industry (=M) 
and the entire economy (=E; excluding finance and real estate, =E), 2001-2011, 
in% 
 
The average organic composition of capital c/v was around 2 in the German 
information industries (table 5) and according to my calculations in the same time 
period (2001-2011) 1.8 in the entire economy (excluding finance and real estate). 
The average monetary profit generated per working hour was 9.0€ in manufacturing, 
8.6€ in the total economy and 10.7€ in the information industries. The average labor 
costs per hour were 30.9€ in manufacturing, 24.7€ in the total German economy and 
30.7€ in the information industries. So both labor costs and profit per hour were in the 
information industries somewhat higher than in the total economy. These differences 
are not striking, the German information industry overall is an average industry in 
terms of the average organic composition, monetary profit per hour and wages per 
hour. 
 
Tables 10 and 11 show the average differences between total prices and total 
investment costs in the information industries, manufacturing and the total German 
economy: 
d=(prices / (c+v)) – 1 
d measures to which percentage degree prices are on average higher than 
investment costs. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 ø 
1 15.3% 16.0% 9.2% 12.7% 10.5% 12.5% 12.2% 10.8% 14.3% 11.3% 8.6% 12.1% 
2 10.4% 6.8% 6.4% 7.3% 10.0% 9.7% 12.8% 16.9% 22.4% 20.3%  12.3% 
3 9.8% 8.2% 8.4% 10.0% 10.5% 11.4% 15.6% 24.6% 31.0% 29.1%  15.9% 
4 11.2% 5.0% 3.8% 3.9% 9.3% 7.6% 8.8% 6.2% 10.3% 8.5%  7.4% 
5 35.3% 44.7% 23.8% 35.3% 23.0% 29.6% 21.9% 17.9% 17.2% 15.4%  26.4% 
6 3.9% 1.2% -3.7% -4.2% -2.1% -1.0% 2.4% -1.6% 3.6% -0.3%  -0.2% 
7 62.7% 53.1% 59.6% 55.1% 48.4% 58.7% 62.8% 62.0% 46.2% 46.2%  55.5% 
8 28.4% 29.2% 29.9% 32.8% 35.6% 37.3% 38.3% 37.8% 33.7% 32.3% 30.0% 33.2% 
ø            20.3% 
Table 10: Rates at which prices are higher than investments in the German 
information industries, 2001-2011, in% 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ø 
M 5.0% 4.9% 5.5% 6.5% 7.1% 8.4% 9.1% 7.2% 3.8% 7.8% 8.5% 6.7% 
E 11.5% 11.8% 11.6% 12.4% 13.0% 14.0% 14.5% 13.4% 11.0% 12.4% 11.8% 12.5% 
Table 11: Rates at which prices are higher than investments in German 
manufacturing and the total economy (excluding finance and real estate), 2001-
2011, in% 
 
The data show significant differences in that in all except one industry (IT), d is on 
average quite higher than in manufacturing and the total economy. Whereas prices 
are on average <81:> 12.5% higher than investments in the total economy and 6.7% 
in manufacturing, the price/investment ratio is on average 20.3% in the German 
information industries. 
 
Selling information has high initial development and investment costs (sunk cost 
rule). It is also highly uncertain if audiences and users will have interest in a specific 
book, film, record, software, television series, advertisement, mobile phone because 
human tastes and cultural preferences are complex and cannot be calculated in 
advance (hit rule, nobody knows anything rule, see also Caves 2002). Initial labor 
costs and requirements are high, whereas the costs and hours for reproducing 
information goods (except live performances and unique pieces of art) are fairly low. 
The data presented in this section are empirical indications for the tendency that 
information companies try to set off the risks involved in their form of production by 
selling their commodities at prices above their output values (on average around 13% 
higher), at prices that are significantly higher than investment costs (on average 
around 20% higher) than in the total economy, which given successful sales results 
in higher profit rates. The price rate of profit in the German information industries was 
in the observed data therefore on average around 30%, whereas it was on average 
only around 7% in the manufacturing industry and 12.5% in the total economy. 
 
3. Labor Productivity in the Information Sector 
 
The question arises whether it is possible or rather difficult to increase productivity in 
the information sector. The hypothesis of limited productivity increases in the cultural 
sector has become known as Baumol’s disease. William Baumol has described a 
“disease” of the information industries, namely that they have problems increasing 
their productivity because of the peculiar <82:> features of information. Baumol and 
Bowen (1965) argued that no productivity increases in a sector or company mean 
that the output per hour does not increase so that increasing wages will cause 
additional costs that most be offset somehow. The performing arts would typically 
have problems of increasing their wages and face “Baumol’s cost disease”. “It is 
apparent that the live performing arts belong to the stable productivity sector of our 
economy. The legitimate theater, the symphony orchestra, the chamber group, the 
opera, the dance-hall can serve as textbook illustrations of activities offering little 
opportunity for major technological change. The output per man-hour of the violinist 
playing a Schubert quartet in a standard concert hall is relatively fixed, and it is fairly 
difficult to reduce the number of actors necessary for a performance of Henry IV, Part 
II” (Baumol and Bowen 1965, 500). The result would be rising prices: “Certainly, in 
most of the industries in which productivity is stable, we would expect the price of the 
product or service to rise relative to the general price level. And there is a widespread 
impression that the arts have indeed behaved in accord with this anticipation” 
(Baumol and Bowen 1965, 501). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the assumption of limited productivity increases 
seems to be only partly true for information, art and culture: Journalists can be made 
to work faster, i.e. to write more articles, cut and paste them online or from press 
releases, etc. Art and culture can be digitally reproduced and thereby become 
commodities that can be reproduced faster. Advertising is content that can be made 
more efficient by targeted advertising that allows presenting different advertisements 
at once to many people. Designers and architects can be made to work on more 
projects simultaneously. Freeman (2008, 3) argues in this context that “reproduction, 
transmission and recording” have “eroded handicrafts limits beyond the point at 
which the handicraft concept remain viable”. The Internet is a medium enabling the 
creation, production, transmission and consumption of information in one space as 
well as the convergence of these processes (prosumption). Freeman argues that in 
the Internet age service productivity “is free to expand without natural impediment” 
(Freeman 2008, 3).  
 
The labor productivity index is an OECD statistical indicator that uses the following 
definition of labor productivity: “Labour productivity is here calculated as the ratio of 
value added volumes to number engaged. Labour productivity represents the amount 
of output per unit of input, output being here defined as value added while the input 
measure used is total employment”5. So it measures value added per employed 
person. The statistical definition acknowledges that it would be better to use hours 
worked data at the industry level, but says such data are thus far not available in the 
OECD STAN database. The number of employed persons is however a good 
approximation for the total hours worked in an industry so that the labor productivity 
index is a feasible measure for understanding the productivity development in the 
information economy.  
 




in 1980 to 137.0 in 2007, in post and telecommunications from 44.8 in 1977 to 158.8 
in 2007, in computing services (including software engineering) from 105.5 in 1998 to 
173.7 in 2007 (data source: OECD STAN). It decreased from 101.8 to 99.6 in other 
community, social, <83:> and personal services that include recreational, cultural and 
sporting activities, such as film production, sound recording, motion picture 
projection, production and broadcasting of television and radio programmes, live 
theatre, concerts, art production and exhibition, entertainment parks, etc (data 
source: OECD STAN). In the UK, the same services increased their labor productivity 
index from 66.7 in 1980 to 102.0 in 2003, post and telecommunications increased the 
index from 29.3 in 1980 to 109.7 in 2003 (data source: OECD STAN). In Germany, 
the labor productivity index increased in printing and publishing from 69.0 in 1970 to 
100.9 in 2007, in post and telecommunications from 21.5 in 1970 to 129.1 in 2007, in 
computing services from 47.2 in 1970 to 95.5 in 2007 etc. (data source: OECD 
STAN). In community, social and personal services, it decreased from 106.9 in 1970 
to 90.3 in 2008 (data source: OECD STAN). In France, the labor productivity index 
increased in printing and publishing from 69.7 in 1970 to 125.1 in 2007, in post and 
telecommunications from 13.8 in 1970 to 168.4 in 2008, and in community, social 
and personal services from 80.6 in 1970 to 101.9 in 2007 (data source: OECD 
STAN). 
 
Such service data are somewhat hard to interpret because they include besides 
broadcasting, arts and live entertainment also sanitation, sewage and refuse 
disposal, activities of membership organisations, hairdressers, funeral services, 
washing and cleaning services, porters, shoeshiners, solariums, baths, etc. But 
overall they could be indicators that live entertainment and arts can have problems 
increasing labor productivity, whereas publishing, computing and telecommunications 
seem to be doing better in this respect. 
 
It is not straightforward to measure the productivity of some information sectors. So 
for example Microsoft constantly releases software updates of its Windows operating 
system, but only once in a while a new version such as Windows 10 and even more 
rarely a completely new type of software. So depending on if our unit of measure is 
the number of software updates, versions or different software types, one will get 
very different productivity measures for Microsoft. A unified and standardised 
measure of productivity based on measuring the output of use-values per unit of time 
is therefore very difficult to obtain. However, all capitalist companies produce 
commodities that yield a specific amount of profit per year. So if one measures the 
monetary output per labor input (e.g. US$/hour), then one can arrive at a unified and 
standardised measure of productivity that can be applied to the information sector.  
 
Such a measure can be obtained by combining two variables from OECD’s STAN 
database, namely value added in current prices (national currency) [VALU] and total 
hours worked by employees [HRSE]. I downloaded these data for six countries and 
then calculated: 
labor productivity = VALU / HRSE [national currency/hour] 
Tables 12-13 present the results. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Av. 
growth 
G 53.8 56.2 57.4 52.0 56.7 55.8 58.2 60.2 57.9 62.1 62.3 61.4 14.0% 
AT 44.4 50.6 52.0 55.2 54.7 57.8 58.5 60.1 61.7 60.8 61.6  38.6% 
F 68.1 69.0 75.3 78.1 79.7 80.9 82.7 82.9 82.2 82.3 83.7 81.8 20.1% 
I 59.4 61.2 67.3 69.0 72.3 74.4 72.3 73.0 72.9 70.4 73.3 70.0 17.8% 










3 568.8 574.4 588.0 591.1 619.4 667.1 
67.5% 
             34.8% 
Table 12: Labor productivity in the information and communication sector, in 
national currency per hour (G=Germany, AT=Austria, F=France, I=Italy, 
NL=Netherlands, S=Sweden) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Av. 
growth 
G 48.1 49.4 50.4 50.1 53.0 53.1 54.0 54.9 55.3 52.2 53.6 54.3 11.4% 
AT 34.0 33.8 36.1 37.9 37.9 39.8 41.9 43.0 45.9 46.0 48.0  41.0% 
F 29.9 30.1 32.3 34.2 35.2 37.2 38.2 38.6 38.8 39.4 40.2  34.4% 
I 44.5 45.3 47.8 48.8 50.0 51.1 48.9 50.7 50.1 48.6 50.5 53.3 19.9% 






















             28.9% 
Table 13: Labor productivity in the arts, entertainment and recreation sector, in 
national currency per hour (G=Germany, AT=Austria, F=France, I=Italy, 
NL=Netherlands, S=Sweden) 
 
In the ISIC 4 classification that OECD STAN uses, the information and 
communication sector consists of publishing, motion picture, video and television 
programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities, 
programming and broadcasting activities, telecommunications, computer 
programming, consultancy and related activities, information service activities. These 
are all sectors where computing, media and information processing play a role. The 
growth of information storage capacity per integrated circuit with falling costs 
(Moore’s Law), the growth of data transmission speed, and the possibility for 
mediation, digitisation, computerisation of outputs and labor activities can increase 
productivity in many of these sub-industries.  
 
<84:> In the ISIC 4 classification, the arts, entertainment and recreation sector 
consists of art, live entertainment and performance, libraries, archives, museums, 
gambling and betting activities, sports and amusement. It is rather difficult to increase 
productivity in arts, live entertainment and in contrast easier in publishing, audio-
visual and broadcast media, telecommunications, IT. Live entertainment such as the 
operation of theatres, concert halls,  
museums, archives, libraries, exhibition sites, gambling and betting, sports clubs and 
facilities, sports events, amusement and team parks, discotheques and clubs include 
consumption at the moment of production, human co-presence, non-storage and 
non-reproducibility. Such culture is just like art production that is also included in this 
sector based on highly original creativity. These characteristics make Baumol’s 
disease – the assumption that it is difficult to increase productivity in the arts (Baumol 
and Bowen 1965) – more likely in this sector than in other information industries. Live 
events can certainly be recorded and then sold as commodities, but such activities 
then belong to and statistically enter the publishing, audio-visual and broadcast 
media sector.  
 
The data in tables 12 and 13 indicate that in all analysed countries, absolute 
productivity is significantly higher in the information/communication sector than in the 
arts and live entertainment sector. Also the cross-country-10 year average 
productivity growth rate is with 34.8% higher in the first sector than in the second, 
where it is 28.9%.  
 
The production and diffusion of content (radio, television, telecommunications, 
software, Internet, advertisements, newspapers and print publications) is based on 
specific qualities of information, especially that it can be shared, easily copied, and is 
not used up in <85:> consumption. In this sector, productivity tends to rise, which is 
reflected in the empirical results presented for the information and communication 
sector in table 8. We have found empirical indications that productivity can rise in the 
information and communication sector. Therefore his argument that the labor theory 
of value does not apply because of a productivity paradox does not hold. In contrast, 





This paper has produced empirical example case data that could be interpreted as 
providing some indications that the information economy has peculiar characteristics 
that need to be taken into account when applying the labor theory of value to it. The 
high initial costs and the high uncertainty of popularity and possible audience rates 
seem to make information companies try to set off the risks involved in their form of 
production by selling their commodities at prices way above their output values and 
at prices that are significantly higher than investment costs than in the total economy, 
which given successful sales results in higher profit rates. 
 
How can we interpret this phenomenon? Some observers argue that the information 
economy is in general based on rent and not on productive labor and profits and 
therefore consumes and robs the profits of other sectors (e.g. Foley 2013, Rigi 2014, 
Teixeira and Rotta 2012). I showed in this paper that there are indications that 
productivity can be increased in the information-processing-based part of the 
information economy that uses computing and data transmission and is rather 
difficult to achieve in the live entertainment sector and the arts sector. Storage growth 
and transmission acceleration are factors helping to increase productivity in these 
sectors that are themselves partly creating ICT innovations and are among the first to 
use them. As a result, the productivity level can be increased in this industry, which 
allows to produce more value per unit of labor-time in comparison to many other 
industries and to <86:> thereby gain surplus-profits. Table 15 provides empirical 
indications for selected countries and regions that productivity measures as monetary 
value per hour worked has in the information and communication (I&C) sector been 
growing significantly faster than in the total economy.  
 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 Latest (2013 or 
2014) 
I&C EU28    80.8 114.5 117.2 
Total EU28   9.2 104.4 107.9 
I&C Germany  55.0 94.5 127.4 145.4 
Total Germany  77.0 91.3 103.9 107.7 
I&C France 46.8 61.6 79.0 110.2 120.3 
Total France 53.0 71.3 93.2 102.4 106.2 
I&C UK   80.1 115.7 112.4 
Total UK   86.9 105.3 106.8 
I&C Finland 34.2 51.2 82.9 110.2 120.3 
Total Finland 41.8 58.4 87.3 98.7 103.8 
I&C Ireland   47.5 162.2 165.2 
Total Ireland   91.8 118.9 121.0 
I&C Norway 28.3 43.1 69.6 124.5 139.6 
Total Norway 48.1 66.2 89.4 92.2 91.3 
Table 15: Index of gross value added per hour worked, 2005=100, total 
economy = non-agriculture business sector excluding real estate (data source: 
OECD.Stat) 
 
More productive companies and industries produce more commodities per hour than 
the average company or industry. Reasons can for example be specific organisation 
and management methods that make the workers produce faster, the use of more 
efficient machines, or more skilful workers. The value of the their single commodity 
will therefore be lower than the average commodity. If the more productively 
produced commodity is sold at an average price, then more profit tends to be 
achieved. More use-values have then been created per hour and therefore yield 
more profit. More developed productive forces in one industry allow the workers in it 
or in a company belonging to it to produce more use-values in less time than others. 
Increasing productivity means the creation of more or qualitatively richer use-values 
and potentially also profit per hour. The more productive industries can reduce their 
labor costs and investment-costs. As a consequence, they can increase the share of 
profit in the price and the share of surplus-labor time in the total labor-time. 
Companies producing less productively have problems to compete. In order to try to 
catch up, they have to reduce the labor-costs so that their rate of surplus-value 
increases and they can still yield some profit when selling at the prices set by the 
more competitive companies. 
 
If, therefore, the capitalist who applies the new method sells his commodity at 
its social value of one shilling, he sells it for 3d. above its individual value, and 
thus he realizes an extra surplus-value of 3d. […] Nevertheless, even in this 
case, the increased production of surplus-value arises from the curtailment of 
the necessary labour-time, and the corresponding prolongation of the surplus 
labour. […] The exceptionally productive labour acts as intensified labour; it 
creates in equal periods of time greater values than average social labour of the 
same kind. […] Hence the capitalist who applies the improved method of 
production appropriates and devotes to surplus labour a greater portion of the 
working day than the other capitalists in the same business. […] On the other 
hand, however, this extra surplus-value vanishes as soon as the new method of 
production is generalized, for then the difference between the individual value of 
the cheapened commodity and its social value vanishes (Marx 1867, 434-436). 
 
Empirical data provides indications that it is rather difficult to increase productivity in 
arts, live entertainment and in contrast easier in publishing, audio-visual and 
broadcast media, telecommunications, IT. We also have tried to show that the 
assumption that the labor theory of value is inapplicable to the information industries 
is not feasible.  
 
The overall conclusion that we can draw is that we need approaches that combine 
the Marxian labor theory of value and empirical economic analysis of macro-
economic data. Such approaches should also think of how to critically theorise and 
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